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Summary  findings
When foreign aid undermines institutional development,  When the development community ignores aid's effect
aid recipients can exhibit the symptoms of aid  on institutions, the outcome depends greatly on initial
"dependence" - benefiting from aid in the short term  conditions. Where institutions are initially weak (as in
but damaged by it in the long term.  nany Sub-Saharan African countries at independence),
Azam, Devarajan, and O'Connell find that one  institutional capacity collapses and foreign aid eventually
equilibrium outcome can be high aid and weak  finances the whole public budget. Where they are
institutions, even when donors and recipients fully  :nitially stronger, the result can be close to the
anticipate aid's effects on institutional development, but  institutions-sensitive equilibrium.
don't take the drastic steps needed to put the country on  The results suggest that, even for countries with similar
the path to independence.  :?er  capita incomes, the foreign aid strategy should be
Another equilibrium outcome can be low aid and  designed to suit the country's  institutional capacity. In
strong institutions.  some cases a short-term reduction in aid may increase a
Their model encompasses such diverse experiences as  country's chances of graduating from aid.
those of Tanzania and the Republic of Korea.
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Grants and concessional loans represent an important source of finance for low-income
developing countries  (Table  1). In  the traditional macroeconomic view,  these  flows
contribute  to  long-run  development  by  releasing  bottlenecks  associated  with  low
incomes. For example, rapid growth may require an investment rate that is too high to be
financed  by  subsistence  saving.  Foreign  aid  provides  the  additional  financing.
Alternatively,  given the narrow  export and  tax bases  associated with  low  incomes,
imports or  government spending may be  the binding constraint.  By  supplementing
domestic resources, transfers from donors enable the achievement of short-run growth
targets.
Under  the plausible  assumption that domestic resource mobilization improves
with per capita income, such aid is self-limiting. The only requirement is that it raise
current incomes. As GNP-shares of domestic saving, exports, and tax revenue rise with
GNP per capita, the need for aid disappears (e.g., McKinnon [1964]). The story seems to
fit well with the experience of Botswana and the Republic of Korea, where very high aid
levels gave way determinedly to rapid growth and "graduation." 1
For each example of graduation, however, there are cases in which aid flows have
grown over several decades. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 median aid as a share of GNP more
than  doubled  between  the  1970s  and  the  1990s.  While  some  countries  such  as
Mozambique have come only recently to very high aid levels, others-such  as Burkina
Faso, Mali, and Tanzania-have  been major aid recipients since independence and in
some cases since the late 1940s (Figure 1). These experiences pose a clear challenge to
the "self-limiting" view of foreign aid. One response is that three or four decades is too
short a period for the major structural changes associated with economic "takeoff." The
returns from aid are still over the horizon: they will emerge eventually provided that
donors keep the aid flowing. But while short relative to the industrialization period in the
West,  forty  years  was  more  than  adequate  for  the  transformation  of  the  newly
industrialized developing countries.
'  American aid to postwar  Europe under  the Marshall Plan is sometimes considered the  archetypical success of
temporary, self-limiting aid. These flows were largely completed by the early 1  950s, at the initial stage of what proved
to be  an extraordinary resumption of growth. But Marshall Plan aid was much smaller relative to the economies
receiving it-between  2 and 3 percent of recipient GNP-than  the flows received by low-income developing countries
in  the decades  since  1960 (see  the entries for  Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia  in  Table  1). De  Long  and
Eichengreen (1991) argue convincingly that the Marshall Plan's contribution to domestic resources in Western Europe
was far secondary in importance to its influence on the development of political and economic institutions there.
2 For the 34 countries for which reasonably continuous data are available.
1Table 1. Net ODA and Technical Cooperation as shares of GNP by Region and Decade
Median of decadal country averages by region
(1)  (')  ~~  ~  ~  ~~~~(3)  (4)
Net ODA
Region and decade  Net ODA/GNP  (eC/GNPl  TC/GNP  TC/Gross ODA
Latin America (22)
1960s  1.29  1.07  0.26  15.24
1970s  1.31  0.92  0.37  27.06
1980s  1.38  0.87  0.39  30.58
1990s  1.58  0.81  0.64  38.04
High-Performing Asian Economies (7)
1960s  1.14  0.80  0.12  13.30
1970s  0.74  0.46  0.19  39.34
1980s  0.15  0.03  0.13  33.95
1990s  0.02  -0.00  0.05  42.65
South Asia (5)
1960s  1.96  1.59  0.11  7.27
1970s  3.84  2.41  0.72  14.20
1980s  8.53  7.04  1.14  16.52
1990s  6.52  5.41  1.11  16.24
Pacific (5)
1960s  7.23  5.84  1.11  24.99
1970s  19.49  13.41  1.98  19.53
1980s  8.10  4.11  0.78  32.15
1990s  9.21  7.49  1.72  24.94
Other developing countries (14)
1960s  2.54  2.42  0.26  11.20
1970s  3.00  2.60  0.22  22.77
1980s  2.93  2.21  0.13  20.39
1990s  1.86  0.99  0.32  24.85
Sub-Saharan Africa (34)
1960s  3.00  2.08  0.72  26.64
1970s  7.53  4.31  2.33  34.59
1980s  11.24  7.38  3.30  27.68
1990s  15.30  11.39  3.44  22.72
All 87 developing countries
1960s  2.09  1.83  0.35  18.00
1970s  3.03  2.03  0.72  30.49
1980s  5.04  4.11  0.92  27.76
1990s  6.02  4.19  1.47  25.17
Note: The number in parentheses represents the number of countries in the data. The table includes all
developing  countries with  1990 populations exceeding 800,000 and  for which more  than one-half  the
observations are available for all four decades ("11990s"  refers to 1990-96). The latter criterion elimninates
the economies in transition.
Source and definitions: Net ODA is the sum of development assistance grants and net disbursements of
concessional  development  assistance  loans.  TC  is  technical  cooperation  grants,  a  sub-category  of
development assistance grants. The data are from the DAC98 CD-ROM (OECD Development Assistance
Committee,  Geographical  Distribution  of  Financial  Flows  to  Developing  Countries,  1960-96).
Development assistance loans are classified by the DAC as concessional if their grant element exceeds 25
percent; see DAC98 for details. GNP in US dollars is ftom the World Bank as reported on DAC98.
2Figure 1. Aid Intensity Over Time For 88 Developing Countries
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A second response recalls the views of early aid critics and the recent debate over
welfare reform in the United States. Authors like Bauer (1971) and Friedman (1958)
predicted that foreign assistance would displace processes of institutional maturation that
were  essential to economic development. Aid would create dependence. The long-run
result of high aid levels would be relative economic regress. A striking feature of these
views is that many of their essentials were shared by the radical left. Andre Gunder Frank
(1966), for example, argued that foreign assistance represented a side payment to elites in
recipient countries, designed to buy their compliance in maintaining the economic and
political dominance of the industrialized countries.
The diversity of actual experience indicates that neither the gap-filling view nor
the  dependency  view  provides  an  adequate  account  of  the  dynamics  of  aid  and
development. In this paper, we present a model that captures some of the features of both
viewpoints, but permits  a multiplicity of  outcomes-including  the  very  different aid
profiles of, say, Korea and Tanzania. To do so we begin with a standard public-finance
problem, to which we add a specific process of institutional maturation. Foreign aid is
explicitly government-to-government in this model, and in an accounting sense it fills a
"fiscal gap." At the same time, it retards the development of institutional competence in
the recipient's public sector. For concreteness we locate institutional development in the
recipient's revenue-collecting ministry. The foundational question becomes the one asked
by Kaldor (1963): "Will developing countries learn how to tax?" The answer depends on
initial conditions, on how much aid is received, and most importantly, on the degree to
which donor and recipient internalize learning-by-doing externalities in  the recipient's
public  sector. The model exhibits two steady states, one involving high  aid and  low
institutional development, the other low aid and strong institutions. Whether a country
3ends up in the second, preferred equilibrium depends on the extent to which donors and
recipients recognize the adverse effects of aid.  on learning-by-doing.
While we have emphasized tax efficiency, the argument can be applied in other
areas. For  example, suppose that learning-by-doing spillovers are concentrated in the
recipient's  nascent  manufacturing  sector,  and  that  manufactured  goods  are  traded
internationally (Bruton [1998]). In the absence of other fonns of financing, a rise in aid
will produce a rise in expenditure and a fall in production (the mediating variable being
the real exchange rate). If learning-by-doing spillovers are associated with accumulated
production experience in the manufacturing sector, aid will again be too large when these
spillovers are ignored. Manufacturing output will in turn be  too small and the rate of
learning-by-doing correspondingly sub-optimal.  As  in  our  case,  graduation  will  be
postponed or prevented altogether.
In section 2, we describe and solve the model, and then use it in  section 3 to
develop a precise interpretation of aid dependence. In a concluding section we investigate
the implications of the analysis for aid policy and discuss some extensions.
2.  The Model
In the absence of foreign aid, governments optimize by  equating the marginal
social benefit of public spending to the marginal social cost of public funds. Equivalently,
the government implements all spending projects that pass the social cost-benefit test
given the existing set of tax instruments and iinancing sources. In Figure 2, the "autarky"
optimum is at point 1, with net social benefit given  by the triangle B] 0.
Now  suppose that foreign aid is available in amount a  to fill the gap between
desired spending g and domestic revenue r. 'Ihe net social benefit, or surplus, enjoyed by
the recipient, gross of any cost of the aid, is now the difference between the areas OB3g
and 002r. Note that this area is always greater than BIW. Using slopes of  1 and -1  for
simplicity, we can define the surplus as
(1)  S(r, g, B, 0) = (Bg - g')  - (Or  +r
2  2
With this setup it is straightforward to study the recipient's  optimal response to
foreign aid, whether provided as a grant or sas  concessional financing (e.g., Kimbrough
[1987]). Missing from  such  accounts, however,  is  a  characterization of  institutional
development in the recipient's public sector. Yet, several observers have pointed to the
pernicious effects of foreign aid on the recipient's ability to develop an effective public
revenue and expenditure system (Botchwey and Brautigam [1998], World Bank [1998]).
In a widely quoted speech in 1993, Kim Jaycox, the World Bank's then vice president for
Africa, said  "...donors  and African governments together have in  effect undermined
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We capture this feature by introducing learning-by-doing of the type studied by
Arrow (1962) and others. More specifically, we assume that the marginal cost of taxation,
represented  by  the  parameter  0,  is  a  decreasing  function  of  accumulated revenue-
collecting experience R, where the latter is measured as
(2)  R,=  Jrse a(t-s)ds.
The  parameter  a  is  nonnegative: a  lower  value  corresponds to  greater  institutional
memory. In the limit (a = 0), revenue experience does not decay at all. For simplicity we
use the form
(3) 
which places a lower bound of zero on the tax inefficiency parameter.
With these items in place we now take the position of a global central planner.
The planner's problem is to maximize the discounted surplus accruing to the recipient
country, net  of the  opportunity cost  of  aid funds to  the  donor  (time  subscripts  are
suppressed unless absolutely necessary):
5(4)  Max f[,lS(r  ,  g5,  0) - a]e-8(s-1)ds
subject to
(4.1)  a=  aO-0 2 r
(4.2)  g=r4a.
The parameter  ,  is the relative weight the planner attaches to recipient-country
welfare. Constraint (4.1) describes the  evolution of tax (in)efficiency over  time,  and
comes directly from (2) and (3). Constraint (4.2) is the public sector's  current budget
constraint; it reflects our assumption that aid and tax revenues are the only available
sources of financing for government spending.
The Hamiltonian for this problem, substituting (4.2) into the maximand, is
(5)  H(r,  g, O,i)  = e-'  [,/S(r, g, 0) - (g - r) + A(a9  - O2r)].
The first-order conditions are
(6.1)  6Sg=l,  or  g=B-)3
(6.2)  A/3S  =A02-1  or  r=  8-1  0  ,A0
(6.3)  A = (d - a)2 -f,S.  + 20Or =(E - a)A + (/  + 2,W)r,
along with (4.1), (4.2), and the transversality condition.
From equation (6.1), govermnent speniding  is constant along any optimal path. An
alternate  way  of  writing  this  condition  is  fi * MSB =1:  the  planner  equates  the
distributionally weighted marginal social benefit of expenditure with the opportunity cost
of funds. Equation (6.2) has a similar interpretation save for the additional termA92,
which reflects the learning-by-doing externality associated with revenue collection.
Differentiating (6.2) with respect to time  and using (4.1) and (6.3) to  replace
dO/dt and d2/dt,  the evolution of revenue over time is given by
(7)  r = (a +- )[r - 8-1] +18.
Equations (7) and (4.1) form a second-order dynamic system in r and 0. With g fixed at
its optimal level by (6.1), we use the public sector's budget constraint (4.2) to substitute
for dr/dt  and r in these equations to get:
(8)  d = (a + 5)[a  - B + 26-i']  -69.
and
6(9)  6=aO+0 2 (a-B+,8 1 -).
Together with the transversality condition, equations (8) and (9) describe the evolution of
aid and tax efficiency along an optimal path.
Figure 3 shows the phase diagram. The dO/dt  locus has two segments, the first of
which  is  the  a-axis  (9  = 0).  The  second  (a  = B - ,8-' _(a/9))  is  the  rectangular
hyperbola labeled hh'.  As a  goes to zero, institutional memory increases and this locus
approaches the axes  9 = 0 and a = g  = B - p6'.  Above the hyperbola, current revenues
are high enough that the accumulation of new experience outweighs depreciation, and tax
inefficiency falls. Between the two loci, depreciation dominates and inefficiency rises.
The da/dt = 0 locus is linear and is labeled aa'  in Figure 3. From equation (8), it
takes the form
a+5
(10)  a =-0  =>  a=(  a  (B-2,6-1)].
For fixed 0, the dynamics for a are unstable around this locus: a is falling to the
left of the locus and rising to the right.
Stationary points occur where  hh' and  aa'  cross. There are two  such points  if
memory is sufficiently long; otherwise there are none. We assume in what follows that
there are two stationary points. A sufficient condition for this, when  ,B  1, is  a  ￿  1/4
(the exact condition, a  < (a + 3/4,628),  is derived in the Appendix).
Of  the  two  stationary  points  in  Figure  3,  the  low-aid,  high-tax-efficiency
equilibrium P is a saddle point while the high-aid, low-tax-efficiency equilibrium M is
locally stable. The transversality condition is satisfied at both points, implying that any
path converging to either equilibrium satisfies the full set of necessary conditions for an
optimum. We show in the Appendix, however, that the planner's discounted welfare is
higher at point P than at point M, by the amount (rp - rM)  / 26,  where ri  (i = M,P)  is the
revenue corresponding to  steady state i. It  follows that from  any initial value of tax
efficiency, the saddle path converging to P is the planner's optimum for  sufficiently low






If tax inefficiency is initially above the planner's steady-state 0,  the optimum
involves declining levels of aid and a gradual accumulation of tax experience. Assuming
that aid cannot be negative, the steady-state value of aid is
(11)  ap = Max[O,  B - (3 +  l-  4a62y)],
where y = 51(2  + 3). For interior steady states we have dap I dB =  1,  dap / d,. > 0,  and
dap / dca  > 0. The first two of these results are intuitive: aid is higher in steady state if
public spending is more productive or if a higher weight is given to recipient-country
welfare.  The  finding  that  faster  institutional  decay  (weaker  institutional  memory)
increases steady-state aid is less obvious. The dynamics of institutional experience would
suggest the opposite, since by equation (4.1) the level of revenue collection required to
keep a given level of accumulated experience intact (9 =  0) is an increasing function of a.
With g fixed at its optimal level, greater current revenue implies lower aid, so a rise in a
shifts the hh schedule to the left. Since the aa'  locus has a positive slope, this increases
steady-state aid.  The aa'  schedule also rotates to the left, but does so by a sufficiently
smaller amount, that the P intersection takes place at a higher aid level. Finally, equation
(11) implies that dap /dŽ  20,  with strict inequality if  a > 0.  A higher social discount
rate therefore means greater aid in the steady state. This result comes from the lower
weight placed on the future payoffs associat:ed  with learning-by-doing.
8Steady-state tax efficiency is given by Op = a / rp = a / (B - - ap) . A rise in
B therefore leaves  Op  unchanged: the increase in public spending is paid for entirely by
aid in the steady state. A rise in /1 reduces tax efficiency (raises Op  ): the greater weight
on recipient-country welfare leads to higher aid in the steady state, and this increase is
spent partly on public services and partly on reducing distortionary taxation. A rise in a
also reduces tax efficiency, as the decreased return to revenue-collecting experience is
reinforced by an increase in aid. As a final comparative statics result, a higher discount
rate  also reduces tax  efficiency, by  substituting aid  for domestic revenue-and  thus
institutional development-in  steady state.
While the equilibrium at P is clearly preferred to that at M, it is important to note
that the recipient is actually better off at M. Hence all the benefits in going from M to P
accrue to the donor. This is intuitive when we recognize that the level of expenditure, g,
is  fixed and the same in M and P.  Nevertheless, the notion that Korea's  graduation
benefited the donors and not Korea may be a bit difficult to swallow. Recall, however,
that in our model the recipient attaches no cost to aid. If he did, and it was sufficiently
large, then the recipient would be better off at P than M. Finally, if the recipient faced a
possible cutoff in aid, he would rather be in a high-institutional-development state, P.
3. Aid Dependence
The  planner's  optimum  involves  a  steady  improvement  in  institutional
performance as the recipient graduates from high aid levels. At each instant the recipient
is "dependent" on aid in the sense that a reduction would lower the current net benefit
associated  with  government  spending  and  taxation.  But  dependence  in  this  sense
represents a  Pareto  optimum. Furthermore, recipient  and  donor  fully  anticipate the
consequences of their actions for institutional development. We now explore how this
concept of dependence changes if agents behave in a non-optimal manner.
What if the planner ignored institutions and institutional development altogether?
This  could  be  characterized  as  the  extremely  myopic  or  naYve view,  but  is  not
inconsistent with the optimal public finance view of budget policy (see Dreze and Stem
[1987]). In this case, the planner solves the "static" public finance problem to obtain
g=  B -,8-
r,  ,8 -1 _0
so that
a,  g* -,8-8 +O
which  is  different from the condition for  a = 0,  a = g* - B-1 + (3/(a  + 9))O,  except
when a  = 0.
In terms of Figure 3, this static solution amounts to a rotation of the aa'  line to
the right. This leads to two equilibria, one of which is stable. The stable equilibrium is
9one which involves less aid and more instiitutional  development than even the planner's
optimum,  P.  The  unstable  equilibrium is  one  with  high  aid  and  low  institutional
development.
Which  equilibrium the  economy  converges to  depends  on  initial  conditions
(Figure 4).  If the country's  institutional capacity was weak to start with (9 > 09  ), the
economy will  require  increasing  amounts of  aid.  Institutions will  deteriorate  until
domestic revenue mobilization is driven to zero and aid finances all of public spending.
This occurs at point a'.  The process does not stop here, however, since taxation capacity
now gradually disappears as cumulative tax experience is driven to zero.  By contrast, if
the country had  relatively strong institutions (9<  0),  the economy converges to  M1,
which is a low-aid, high-institutional-quality state. In either situation, the myopic planner




The  above  discussion points  to  a. possible  dichotomy  between  aid-receiving
countries that have strong and weak institutions.  For instance, many African countries
have similar per capita incomes to India and Pakistan, but arguably different levels of
institutional  development.  In  Africa,  ignoring  the  effect  of  aid  on  institutional
development can be very costly (to donor and recipient alike), with a strong possibility
that  the  economy  becomes  trapped  in  a  high-aid,  low-institutional-development
equilibrium.  In India and Pakistan, the effect of ignoring institutional development may
be relatively benign. The historical experieace supports this hypothesis.  Aid to India and
10Pakistan has declined significantly when comparing the 1970s with the 1990s (Figure 1).
Interestingly, so has aid to Botswana.  But aid to many African countries, including Mali
and Tanzania, has increased substantially between the two decades.
Instead of being myopic throughout, what if the planner realized at some point
that aid was undermining domestic institutions? Note that the myopic solution involves
too  much aid at each point on the dynamic path. Once the institutional dimension is
recognized, the optimal strategy is to reduce aid "up front," making a horizontal jump in
Figure 5 from the aa'  schedule to the saddle path. This adjustment brings out two very
different aspects of the recipient's aid dependence. The first is always present: reducing
aid hurts the recipient. The reduction in aid requires an immediate increase in domestic
revenue,  which  in  turn  produces  an  immediate  fall  in  the  recipient's  surplus  (S).
Moreover, since there is no immediate payoff to greater learning-by-doing, this loss is
greater than the reduction in aid and the planner's payoff falls in the short run as well.
But the present value of this move, from the planner's perspective, is positive. This is
precisely because of the second aspect of aid dependence: excessive aid levels hold back




11Figure 6 shows the increase in flow utility,6S - a associated with a move from the
myopic path to the optimal path, assumingj  an initial institutional capacity between  O,p
and  OM.  Initial losses persist for some period but are more than offset in present value
terms by gains due to faster institutional development.
As  long  as  institutional  capacity is  strong  enough to  justify  some  domestic
revenue  mobilization  initially,  institutions  will  improve  or  deteriorate  over  time.
Participants are therefore likely to infer, eventually, the true relationship between revenue
collection and' efficiency. A more subtle form of myopia exists when this relationship is
incorporated but the eventual superiority of the equilibrium at P  is  given insufficient
weight. There is an infinity of such paths, converging to the equilibrium at M (two of
these are shown in Figure 5). Expectations are fully rational on such paths. The planner
realizes that  aid slows  down institutional development, and  at each  instant taxation
capacity evolves exactly as expected. Moreover, these paths  satisfy the transversality
condition for the planner's optimum. But the planner fails to realize how much 0-cutting
could be  achieved in the long run; and thlis failure of  ambition limits the recipient's
accumulation of experience in the short run. Graduation does not occur, for the simple
reason that  institutional development is too  slow. Eventually donor and recipient are
stuck at M, with high aid levels and low inslitutional capacity.
Figure 6
Difference  in flow utility





Our aim in this paper has been to give precise analytical content to the widely
used concept of aid dependence. All aid recipients are dependent in the sense that a
substantial reduction in aid will hurt in the short run. Our focus has instead been on the
interaction  of  aid with  institutional  capacity. If  aid  displaces domestic  institutional
development at the margin, an aid relationship that ignores this link will at best slow
down eventual graduation. Where institutional capacity is initially weak, as in many Sub-
Saharan African countries at independence, the attraction of gap-filling aid to both parties
will be strong enough to displace the recipient's existing institutional capacity, locking
donor and recipient into a permanent situation of high aid and low institutional capacity.
Furthermore, even when donors and recipients recognize the importance of institutional
development, they may not take the drastic steps needed to put the country on the path to
graduation.
A final question concerns policy strategy. The problem as laid out here has the
feature that efficiency and distribution cannot be easily separated. Moving to the optimal
path  is efficient but  the recipient's  discounted surplus falls (government spending is
unchanged, so the benefits of learning-by-doing on the revenue side accrue to the donor
in the form of lower aid). A Pareto improvement can be achieved only if prospective
gains  can  be  redistributed  towards  the  recipient  without  overly  compromising
institutional development.
Appendix
Deriving the condition  for two stationary points:
For simplicity we work with the system in r and 0 rather than a  and 0. Our dynamic
equations are (4.1) and (7). From (4.1), d9l  dt = 0 when 0 = ai  r. From (7), dr/ dt = 0
when  9 =ry(,8/1  - r),  where  y = 8 l(a  + 3).  Eliminating 0, we have  the  quadratic
equation r2 - l3'r + ay  = 0, with roots r =  -1  ± /3-1  (1  4a62 r) 1 /2  .These roots are real
provided that 4/83 2 < y,  which is the condition given in the text.
Proof that the panner  prefers P to M and the recipient prefers M to P:
The discounted value of the planner's welfare at any stationary point is W = (,8S - a)/1.
Since government spending is identical at both stationary points, the difference in the
planner's welfare at the P and Mpoints is
8(W,  -WM)  =83[OMrM  +(rM  12)]  +aM  -/3[0rp  +(rp 2 12)]-aP.
But  Or  = a at both points (because d9/dt  = 0);  and from the quadratic equation derived
above  we  can  replace  r2 in  each  equilibrium with  6f1 r+ar.  We  therefore  have
136(WP-Wm)=(rM-rp)/2+am-ap.  With  g  identical  across  stationary  points,
aM - ap  = rp  - rM  and  Wp - WM  = (rP - rM)I 2 6 .
The discounted value of the recipient's welfare (using the sarne discount rate and
applying  a  zero  shadow  price  to  aid)  is  /3S/8 at  any  stationary  point.  Since
,6(Sp - SM) = (rM  - rp)  / 26, the recipient is better off at the M equilibrium.
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